19,259 research outputs found

    Ge quantum dot arrays grown by ultrahigh vacuum molecular beam epitaxy on the Si(001) surface: nucleation, morphology and CMOS compatibility

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    Issues of morphology, nucleation and growth of Ge cluster arrays deposited by ultrahigh vacuum molecular beam epitaxy on the Si(001) surface are considered. Difference in nucleation of quantum dots during Ge deposition at low (<600 deg C) and high (>600 deg. C) temperatures is studied by high resolution scanning tunneling microscopy. The atomic models of growth of both species of Ge huts---pyramids and wedges---are proposed. The growth cycle of Ge QD arrays at low temperatures is explored. A problem of lowering of the array formation temperature is discussed with the focus on CMOS compatibility of the entire process; a special attention is paid upon approaches to reduction of treatment temperature during the Si(001) surface pre-growth cleaning, which is at once a key and the highest-temperature phase of the Ge/Si(001) quantum dot dense array formation process. The temperature of the Si clean surface preparation, the final high-temperature step of which is, as a rule, carried out directly in the MBE chamber just before the structure deposition, determines the compatibility of formation process of Ge-QD-array based devices with the CMOS manufacturing cycle. Silicon surface hydrogenation at the final stage of its wet chemical etching during the preliminary cleaning is proposed as a possible way of efficient reduction of the Si wafer pre-growth annealing temperature.Comment: 30 pages, 11 figure

    Detecting Byzantine Attacks Without Clean Reference

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    We consider an amplify-and-forward relay network composed of a source, two relays, and a destination. In this network, the two relays are untrusted in the sense that they may perform Byzantine attacks by forwarding altered symbols to the destination. Note that every symbol received by the destination may be altered, and hence no clean reference observation is available to the destination. For this network, we identify a large family of Byzantine attacks that can be detected in the physical layer. We further investigate how the channel conditions impact the detection against this family of attacks. In particular, we prove that all Byzantine attacks in this family can be detected with asymptotically small miss detection and false alarm probabilities by using a sufficiently large number of channel observations \emph{if and only if} the network satisfies a non-manipulability condition. No pre-shared secret or secret transmission is needed for the detection of these attacks, demonstrating the value of this physical-layer security technique for counteracting Byzantine attacks.Comment: 16 pages, 7 figures, accepted to appear on IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, July 201

    Electron-doped phosphorene: A potential monolayer superconductor

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    We predict by first-principles calculations that the electron-doped phosphorene is a potential BCS-like superconductor. The stretching modes at the Brillouin-zone center are remarkably softened by the electron-doping, which results in the strong electron-phonon coupling. The superconductivity can be introduced by a doped electron density (n2Dn_{2D}) above 1.3×10141.3 \times10^{14} cm−2^{-2}, and may exist over the liquid helium temperature when n2D>2.6×1014n_{2D}>2.6 \times10^{14} cm−2^{-2}. The maximum critical temperature is predicted to be higher than 10 K. The superconductivity of phosphorene will significantly broaden the applications of this novel material
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